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Briefing Paper 
A SKETCH OF THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE GULF WAR 
by A J Hughes Hallett,Department of Economics, 
University of Strathclyde and CEPR London 
and Yue Ma, Oepartinent of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
1. The Issues 2. An Economic Model 
The economic analysis of a war involves two 
separate but interconnected issues. There is the 
question of how to finance the necessary 
expenditures on men, materials and weapons; and 
there is the question of how the financing of 
those expenditures, and how the loss of productive 
capacity, or the interruption of trade or normal 
financial relations, will affect the combatant's 
economy and its main trading partners. The former 
requires an assessment of the costs, in terms of 
resources, needed to prosecute the war 
successfully, and then a judgement on the best way 
of supplying those resources. The latter focuses 
on economic consequences in terms of incomes, 
investment, supply capacity and prices, and also 
in terms of conditions in the financial and 
foreign exchange markets. Keynes made the 
point, in an earlier context, when he gave two of 
his books the titles "How to Pay for the War" 
(1940) and "The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace" (1919). 
The British and American governments have 
evidently thought a lot about how to pay for the 
Gulf War, and their effort to obtain financial 
contributions from non-combatants in the OECO, and 
from Gulf Co-operation Council countries, have 
been fairly successful. In recent days they have 
also thought - in strictly political terms - about 
how to win the peace, after winning the war. But 
what they have not done, at least at an official 
level, is to consider the economic implications of 
the Gulf War. The ability to win the peace, and 
the willingness of other countries to support new 
arrangements designed to produce more stability in 
the region, must surely depend in part on the 
economic situation created by the war. This 
note projects the likely consequences of the war 
for the OECD countries, together with some of the 
indicators for the Gulf countries and the 
developing economies (LDCs). 
To generate the necessary projections, we have 
used a "state of the art" econometric model - in 
this case the International Monetary Funds' (IMF) 
multicountry model, MULTIMOD, which contains 
linked models for each of the group of 7 
industrialised countries (the US, Japan, Canada, 
Germany, France, Italy and the UK). There is also 
a model for the smaller industrialised countries 
(the rest of the OECD) as a block, and models for 
the Gulf countries and for the developing 
economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Each 
of these national or regional models is linked to 
the others through bilateral trade flows and 
through capital movements and exchange rates which 
in turn influence domestic financial markets. 
MULTIMOD is the IMF's official econometric model, 
used to construct the medium term scenarios which 
are published in the IMF's annual review World 
Economic Outlook. The models' specification 
explains the main expenditure categories and 
production flows in each country, with employment, 
investment, prices, interest rates and exchange 
rates being determined as a result. Financial 
markets, trade flows, and capital movements 
(including loans to, and interest payments from, 
the LDCs) are included. The oil market and an 
"aggregated commodity" market are also picked out. 
Government activities are incorporated, with 
explanations of their fiscal expenditures and 
receipts (plus "budget constraints" which show how 
any fiscal deficits are to be financed, and hence 
what the tax implications for the future are) and 
of their monetary instruments and monetary 
targets. Much of the behaviour modelled is 
forward looking (with respect to the financial 
variables, inflation, interest and exchange rates, 
also certain expenditure categories) in the sense 
that expectations of future events influence 
current decisions and are themselves solved 
jointly with current forecasts of prices, output, 
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interest rates, fiscal variables etc. The model 
was last updated and re-estimated by the IMF's 
research department in 1990. 
3. The War Scenarios 
We have simulated 4 possible scenarios over the 
period 1990-95. 
a) No invasion, no war: a baseline simulation 
over the period 1991-1995, which sets the 
price of oil at $20/barre1 (the pre-August 2 
price) in 1990, $21 in 1991, $22 in 1992 and 
so on up trend. All other exogenous 
variables are taken to follow the IMFs 
official projections as published in the 
World Economic Outlook for 1990. This 
baseline is then the model's projection of 
the future, given that World Economic outlook 
and no further policy changes. 
b) Sanctions but no war: As above, but where the 
oil price averages $26 per barrel in 1990, 
$35 per barrel in 1991, and floats freely 
with no constraints to demand and supply 
thereafter: i.e. Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil 
production is lost August 1990 - December 
1991, but comes back on stream in 1992. 
Fiscal expenditures also increase by 
$18bi11ion, $1bi11ion and $0.6bi11ion in the 
US, UK and France, respectively, to reflect 
the build-up of forces in the Gulf. But 
there is no fighting to increase those 
expenditures any further. 
c) A Short War of 2 months duration: (and no 
The oil 
but 
attacks on Saudi oil installations) 
price averages $26 in 1990 as above 
falls to $15 in 1991 as strategic stocks are 
released, followed by the Kuwaiti and Iraqi 
oil fields coming back into production to 
generate cash for reconstruction. The oil 
price floats freely from 1992 onwards. 
Fiscal expenditures are larger and consist of 
the start up costs above, plus $45b for the 
US over the 2 month period; UK $4b for 2 
months; and France $1.8b for 2 months. We 
suppose that 25% of these expenditures enter 
domestic expenditure; and 75% don't (i.e. 
25% are spent directly on 
goods/services/extra salaries etc; 75% is 
written off for equipment used). 
d) A Long War of 9 months: (with some damage to 
allied oil facilities). The oil price 
averages $26 in 1990, and $50 in 1991 (Saudi 
production is interrupted, say), but $20 in 
1992 (with the war finished, production comes 
back to normal in 1992 to pay for economic 
and political reconstruction), and a free 
float thereafter. Fiscal expenditures run at 
9/2 times the 2 month figures above, i.e. 
$204billion for US, $18billion for UK, 
$8billion for France, plus the same start up 
costs. 
Both war scenarios have been simulated with and 
without fiscal contributions from other countries. 
In both scenarios, those contributions run at 
their currently announced levels: 
Japan $13billion ($11b to US, $1b each to UK and 
France) 
Germany $8billion ($6b to US, $1 bill ion each to UK 
and France) 
Gulf Co-operation Council Countries $27billion 
($22billion to US, $2^billion each to UK and 
France). 
These contributions reduce the fiscal deficit of 
the recipient but increase it for the donor. 
They pass through the balance of payments, and 
hence potentially affect exchange rates and 
interest rates. Aggregate fiscal expenditures by 
the combatants themselves remain unchanged of 
course. 
Each country faces a budget deficit constraint 
(i.e. governments have to finance and pay 
interest on the fiscal debt). In most cases this 
forces tax rates to rise (with a lag). For 
political reasons, and in view of the emerging 
recession in the US and the UK, we also simulate 
what happens if taxes are not allowed to rise. 
This is important for the US, given its large 
existing fiscal deficit. 
4. The General Pattern of the Results 
4.1 All results are quoted as deviations from 
baseline projections. The main changes come 
from the changes in the oil price, with the 
direct costs of the war very much in second 
place. Hence the contrast between a short 
war and a long war is influenced more by what 
happens to oil prices [if, for example Saudi 
Arabian production is interrupted and/or a 
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loss of confidence is felt in the financial 
markets because the war goes on longer than 
people expected]. The long war results are 
not so much influenced by the expenditures 
being 4^ times higher, or by the 
contributions from other countries, as they 
are by movements in the oil price. A long 
war does mean an extra 1% GNP growth and an 
extra 1% on the inflation rate, plus some 
difficulties in financing the fiscal deficit 
in the US. But those expenditure effects are 
"second order" compared to the "supply side" 
effects of any oil price changes which affect 
unit production costs right across the 
economy. The same is true for the UK, 
France, Germany and the smaller 
industrialised countries, although without 
the accompanying fiscal deficit problems. 
The extra growth implied by a long war would 
neatly remove the current recession in both 
the UK and US. 
4.2 A major feature of all the results is that a 
new cycle is included in industrial 
economies: like those indicated by the 
cycles marked A and B in figure 1. 
Figure 1 
tmrA. 
* JW* 
So surges are partially (or, in some cases, 
mostly) offset by a reversal which sets in a year 
or two after the war finishes because oil prices 
revert to roughly pre-war levels (and also because 
fiscal expenditures slow down). This leaves some 
variables a bit higher than their pre-war levels 
and others back on trend. Thus equilibrium growth 
is re-established from about 1992 onwards (in the 
case of a short war), and from 1994 (long war) if 
the war is a long one. The only exceptions appear 
the US and UK, where the cycles persist beyond 
1995. 
4.3 The main effect of constraining taxes not to 
rise is to spread the deficits over several 
years (up to the end of 1994). The burden of 
this debt has the effect of slowing down 
growth in 1994/1995. But the lower tax rates 
also imply less of a swing into "recession" 
in the year following the war (1992)which in 
this case only means lower growth rates than 
in the baseline "no war" scenario. It also 
means the inflationary impact of the extra 
expenditures is somewhat milder. Hence the 
swings sketched in figure 1 are milder and, 
in the case of the fiscal deficit, they are 
removed altogether. However all these 
changes, compared to the case where tax rates 
are allowed to adjust up, are rather small -
perhaps 0.2% off the growth rate and 0.1% off 
the inflation rate. 
5. Results for the Industrial Countries: A Short 
War 
The most striking result of a short war is that 
the industrialised economies are disturbed very 
little. Compared to the no war baseline 
projections, they all lose about 0.2% of GNP in 
1991 with a corresponding reduction in their 
inflation rates. This loss of output and 
reduction in inflation is coming from the increase 
in oil prices in 1990 which outweighs the mild 
fiscal stimulus in 1991. For the US and Japan the 
economic slow down is even smaller; about 0.1% off 
GNP and prices. Slower growth naturally means 
small improvements in their trade balances, except 
in the UK where a further deterioration in the 
trade balances appears because oil (export) 
revenues fall E^billion with the oil price in 
1991. 
A short war does impose extra fiscal deficits in 
the UK and US, at 0.4% and 0.7% of GNP (or 
Elbillion and $26billion respectively); although, 
like everything else, the effect of these fiscal 
disturbances vanishes within a year [except in the 
US where the effects linger until 1993]. The UK's 
deficit would be easily funded; the increases in 
the US deficit would be more difficult to fund, 
given the existing deficit. On the other hand, 
contributions by Japan and Germany would more or 
less wipe those deficits out. But, in neither 
case, are the financial markets disturbed in any 
way; higher interest rates, and the crowding out 
of investment, are not consequences of a short 
war. 
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Thus a short 2 month war has no significant 
financial or income implications for the OECD 
economies. Naturally it has some effect on the 
Gulf countries, where national incomes fall by 
0.3% in 1991 (but recover in 1992). And the LDCs 
benefit from lower oil prices (output prices fall 
by 0.7%) although that has no impact on growth 
since the greater availability of foreign exchange 
(in the form of higher net export earnings) are 
pre-tempted by the need to service debt. 
6. Results for the Industrialised Countries: 
Long War 
rise very mildly in nominal terms. 
Given greater extra inflation than the 
other G7 countries, and that this rise 
is apparently not connected with the oil 
price, this result reflects our 
inability (under ERM rules) to 
depreciate the nominal exchange rate 
compared to our partners. That is 
something of a constraint because the 
current account remains in deficit, by 
0.4% of GNP more than would have been 
the case had there been no war. 
b) Contributions to the War Costs (table 2) 
a) The Financial Implications (table 1) 
* A long war adds about 2\% - 3}% of GNP 
onto US fiscal deficit in 1991 i.e. 
nearly doubling it by adding an extra 
$95 - $130billion to the existing 
deficit. 
* A long war makes the UK fiscal deficit 
rise to i% GNP in 1991; but we start 
from small surplus so it does not have 
any great implications for interest 
rates, investment or the exchange rate. 
From 1992-5, the budget shows a small 
tendency to return to surplus given the 
faster growth from lower oil prices (and 
despite the lower tax take from lower 
oil revenues). 
* Both fiscal deficits are reversed from 
1992 onwards; for the US, the deficit is 
then running at about 0.6% of GNP (or 
$23billion) lower each year than it 
would have been in the no war case 
[because, as oil price falls, output 
rises, and fiscal receipts rise]. A 
similar pattern holds for the UK. 
However tax rates have to rise 1% in 
both the US and UK in 1992, 1993 and 
1994, in order to offset the US deficit 
increase and the emerging deficit in the 
UK. 
* Difficulties in financing the US fiscal 
deficit pushes the effective exchange 
rate for the US dollar up 1% in nominal 
terms. The trade gap widens a little 
therefore (see below). 
* The UK exchange rate is projected to 
In the long war scenario, contributions from 
non-combatants make little difference (-0.1% 
to GNP, -0.1% to inflation rate) except in so 
far as they reduce the US budget deficit in 
1991 and 1992. They also reduce the UK 
deficit; but increase the deficits in 
Japan, Germany by ^% of GNP. The only other 
effects are slightly higher interest rates in 
France, and a fall in the real Japanese 
exchange rate (which is then reversed in 
1994/5). 
If there are no contributions from others, 
the US deficit increases by an extra 3/4% of 
GNP (from 2.8% to 3.5% of GNP). That is a 
lot. For UK the extra expenditures come to 
about 0.4% of GNP. But if there are 
contributions, Japan's deficit rises by 0.4% 
of GNP, and the German deficit increases by 
about 5% of GNP. These are large figures; 
but they are for 1991 only, and vanish 
thereafter since extra taxes and extra growth 
then offset the extra expenditures. In the 
short war the fiscal deficits run at get 
about 40% of these increases. So you don't 
get away from financing problems even in a 
short war. 
The increase in the German fiscal deficit is 
significant because the German government may well 
have difficulties in financing that deficit in 
addition to financing the expenditures it is 
already having to make in reconstructing Eastern 
Germany. The German reunification programme has 
already moved the fiscal deficit from ^% of GNP to 
4% of GNP over the last 5 months of 1990, so the 
war is imposing an increase in the budget deficit 
of about 15% of the extra federal government 
expenditures needed for reconstruction in Eastern 
Germany as expected at the start of the war. We 
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now know that those expenditures were grossly 
underestimated, but this deficit increase is the 
same size as the emergency reunification funding 
package introduced by the German government on 12 
February 1991. It was not easy to secure funding 
for the emergency package and we can expect 
similar upward pressures on interest rates when 
the war contribution is funded. 
Interest Rates, Investment and the ERM (tables 1 
and 2) 
c) Short term interest rates rise in the US by 
li% points in long war (but the long rates 
only rise i% point) in 1991 and 1992; they 
then fall below the pre-war 8% mark. The 
UK short and long rates are not affected 
because there are no great financing 
difficulties. German short rates rise "I%, 
reflecting the tight monetary policy needed 
to control inflation following reunification 
and the extra growth from the war. Japan has 
a similar reaction, raising interest rates 
1%. Contributions to the war costs hardly 
affect these interest rate changes. 
d) Some crowding out of private investment 
appears from higher interest rates; US 
investment falls i% below pre-war trend. The 
higher interest rates means a higher Dollar 
in real and nominal terms. That makes the US 
trade deficit 0.7% GNP (say $25bi11ion) worse 
in 1991; it then gets better from 1992 
because the dollar depreciates again once 
the wartime fiscal expansion is reversed. 
In the UK, investment is not affected by 
higher interest rates although there is 
evidence of a worsening trade deficit. 
German and Japanese investment rises slightly 
despite the 1% rise in short term interest 
rates which results from the tight monetary 
policy needed to control inflation and the 
extra growth generated by the war. France, 
however, adopts a less anti-inflationary 
policy (interest rates rise only ?%) despite 
a larger fiscal deficit in 1991. The result 
is higher inflation than in Germany and 
strains within the European exchange rate 
system (ERM). 
In fact table 1 shows that the real effective 
exchange rate for the DM moves very little 
(and that is not affected by making 
contributions to the war costs: see table 2). 
By contrast the Pound and Franc rise, after 
an initial dip, in response to the higher 
interest rates forced by the need to fund 
their extra fiscal expenditures. The US also 
has a rising exchange rate while interest 
rates are high due to deficit financing 
(1991/2), but a falling exchange rate as that 
deficit is reduced. Japan, like Germany, has 
no significant movements in its real exchange 
rate - unless contributions to the war costs 
are made, in which case the Yen first 
depreciates and then appreciates as those 
contributions are successfully financed. 
Thus, on a bilateral basis the ERM shows 
distinct strains since the DM has to move 
more against the other European currencies 
(the Pound and the franc) then the other 
countries move against each other. The 
strain therefore comes from the Mark being 
out of step, and not from weakness elsewhere. 
Indeed, it is because the Yen only shows the 
kind of realignments which are needed from 
the Mark when the additional fiscal deficit 
of contributing to the war costs is imposed, 
that we know see that it is inflationary 
pressure and the burden of financing German 
reunification (not the war costs) which is 
causing difficulties in the ERM. By 
contrast, the DM requires realignment whether 
or not war contributions are made. The 
difficulty is that the rules of the ERM game 
effectively rule out realignments which means 
the Pound, Franc, Lire etc all have to 
follow, with their interest rates, the DM's 
rise against the Dollar and Yen. Thus any 
economic expansion that might have spilled 
over from increased demand in Germany, or 
from the war effort, is more likely to spill 
over to the US and Japan than to other parts 
of the EEC. That would mean the combined 
impacts of German reunification and war costs 
would produce a recession in the UK and 
France, in place of some expansion all round, 
and hence significant strains within the 
European Monetary System. Nonetheless 
realignments within the ERM would have to be 
significantly smaller than those of the ERM 
currencies against the Dollar. 
i) Growth/inflation in a Long Mar (table 1) 
* US output rises 1JZ p.a. in 1991, falls 
i% in 1992 on demobilisation, and then 
rises again \% in 1994-5 with falling 
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oil prices. 
* The UK position is similar: an extra 2% 
output in 1991 (the oil price rise 
contributes to this too). That would 
remove our recession. But the extra 
growth vanishes in 1992 as the oil price 
and expenditures both drop. It 
reappears at i% p.a. in 1993-5 on the 
back of lower oil and production costs. 
That is a more pronounced cycle than in 
the US. 
* Output rises in the US and UK because 
fiscal expenditures rise, but the drag 
from the associated fiscal debt does not 
cut in until some time later (growth 
only turns negative in 1992-3). But it 
also comes because producers and 
consumers anticipate income growth and 
lower oil prices (or production costs) 
in later years. That makes it 
worthwhile to increase activity and 
stock up in advance, and provides a 
greater impulse for growth. 
+ The extra GNP growth also gets reversed 
(partially) during 1992 and 1993. 
Typically i-3/4% of GNP is knocked off 
each year (say $20-30billion) in the 
long war case. There are also reversals 
in a short war, but they are small (0.2% 
GNP). 
* France and Germany get extra 1% growth 
in 1991 and that tails off. That is an 
awkward result for Germany whose 
economy is already growing at 5% and is 
suffering significant excess demand as a 
result of the reunification process. It 
is noticeable that German growth is not 
reversed during the 1991-1995 period. 
This extra growth will not make it any 
easier for the German authorities to 
control inflation. 
* Japan gets much less out of this; 
production averages less than i% above 
the no war baseline solution with no 
evidence of a recession, while prices 
run at a similar rate below their no war 
path. Elsewhere the war has little 
effect. 
* The extra growth of 0.4% in Japan is 
slightly more than its proposed 
contribution to allied war costs; the 
extra growth of 1% in Germany is not 
quite twice its proposed contribution. 
The German and Japanese growth must come 
from lower oil prices, and hence lower 
production costs, and increased inter-
OECD trade since their domestic fiscal 
expenditures do not rise. 
* US inflation: an extra 1^% in 1991, but 
that is more than reversed when fiscal 
expenditures are reversed and oil prices 
fall in 1992. 
* UK inflation: an extra 2% in 1991 but 
not fully reversed later. That is 
likely to cause further difficulties for 
the UK economy since it means that 
interest rates do not fall as much as in 
other countries in the 1994-5 period. 
* French inflation: an extra 3/4% in 1991 
* German inflation down i% because of very 
aggressive monetary contraction 
(interest rates have risen 1% with no 
fiscal expansion). As we recently saw 
last week, Bundesbank policy is 
determined to kill inflation. Japan 
also enjoys a lower inflation rate. 
* Contributions to war costs make no 
material changes to these figures. 
f) Constant Taxes Rates in the US and UK (table 3) 
If taxes are preventing from adjusting to pay 
for the war, there are large changes in the 
US fiscal deficit - and small ones in the UK 
fiscal position. The US deficit is the same, 
in 1991, as reported above; but it continues 
to run at an extra i% of GNP above its 
existing (no war) projected level through 
1992, 1993 and 1994. This raises US short 
interest rates slightly more, and damps 
growth and investment slightly (but only 0.1% 
each). Inflation is 0.2% lower during 1993-
5. The US Dollar depreciates a little more 
strongly during that period having risen 
earlier on the back of the higher interest 
rates needed to fund the fiscal deficit. The 
trade gap is not affected. In the UK we get 
smoother growth, but at more or less the same 
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level, because the emerging surplus of 1993-5 
is smaller. Otherwise tax restrictions have 
no material effect. 
7. The Reconstruction of the Gulf Countries 
A much neglected implication of the war is the 
opportunities for construction and manufacturing 
firms in the OECO to participate in the 
reconstruction of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (and 
conceivably also Iraq). With the war unfinished, 
it is impossible to know how much reconstruction 
will be needed. However one figure which has been 
discussed is $60 billion for the Kuwait area. If 
the allies were to be awarded reconstruction 
contracts of that size, split in proportion to 
their long war costs and spread over the three 
years 1992-4 inclusive , the likely outcomes 
change in three interesting respects. 
First, the cycle imposed on GNP and income growth 
in other exercises is now largely removed. 
Reconstruction can only have an impact from 1992. 
But when it appears it removes the 1992-93 
downswings in national income, which appeared in 
reaction to demobilisation and the costs of 
financing the fiscal deficits (higher interest 
rates etc.). For the US,the 1% of national income 
that was lost during the 1992-93 downswing is now 
turned into a tiny gain (0.1%) on the underlying 
trend. In relative terms that may be small, but 
it is worth about $40 billion a year. By 1995 the 
effect will have been lost (growth falls 1/2%) 
because the reconstruction "boom" will have passed 
but the deficit financing costs still have to be 
carried. 
The pattern for the UK is very similar; 
incomes/output rises by 0.6% in 1992 (instead of 
falling below trend) and remains 0.3% above trend 
until 1995. But the effects on France, Germany 
and Japan are different. France and Japan show 
little impact; for Germany the GNP cycle is 
smoothed, giving a steady decline from 1991's 
peak. 
So the US and the UK both gain in the period 1992-
93 - a matter of great political significance 
since both governments have to face re-election by 
1992. There are other small changes, for example 
inflation rises 0.5-0.25% point in the US and UK 
in 1994, but interestingly there is no material 
change in interest rates or the fiscal deficits. 
The second impact of the reconstruction contracts 
would be a rise in the US dollar - its effective 
nominal rate rises 3/4% in 1992, and is still 1/2% 
higher in 1995, as a result of the extra exports 
generated by reconstruction. Interestingly the 
same effect is not seen elsewhere; the Pound, 
Franc and DM do not move, while the Yen falls 1/3% 
throughout because Japan does not participate in 
the reconstruction. Similarly the US and UK trade 
balances improve 0.5-0.25% of GNP), with minor 
positive changes in France, Germany and Japan. 
That confirms a small revival in world trade has 
been generated, but that does not take the 
pressure off the ERM which we noted earlier. 
The third and biggest consequence of 
reconstruction is that the Gulf countries no 
longer lose incomes at the rate of 2 to 2.5% over 
1991-95. In fact they only lose 0.4% in total 
over 1991-94, but record a loss of 1.8% in 1995 
when reconstruction stops. They are therefore 
11.5% (or $62 billion) better off than in our 
previous scenarios. This may seem a strange 
result since they have to "import" their 
reconstruction - but they have to finance it too. 
This they do by pumping oil, causing the price of 
oil to fall further in 1993. Since the demand for 
oil is relatively elastic, Gulf country earnings 
(and presumably tax revenues) and hence GNPs 
actually rise. That explains their improvement; 
and the anticipation of further oil price falls in 
1993 is the mechanism which pushes OECD incomes up 
in the politically sensitive year of 1992. 
8. Gulf countries with no reconstruction 
Growth slower by about 2% pa as a result of the 
war - because they are contributing to the costs 
of fighting and then because the oil price falls, 
so their GNP and revenues start to fall from 1992 
onwards compared to pre-war trend. Growth slows 
in 1991 too, because high oil prices damp world 
demand. This negative effect on incomes continues 
until 1995, and possibly beyond. 
9. Conclusion 
The allies may well be fighting in the Gulf to 
redress the balance of military power in the 
middle east and to return Kuwait to the Kuwaitis. 
But it also about oil, or more precisely the price 
of oil. However that does not mean, as so often 
claimed, that it is about the ownership of oil, in 
the sense of a degree of western control over oi1 
supplies. On the contrary, the war is partly to 
ensure that no-one controls a significant market 
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share since supplies will ultimately meet demands 
at a certain price whoever controls the supply 
side. The important point for the West and the 
developing countries, as well as for the Gulf 
countries, that that price should be a free market 
price so as to increase growth and improve the 
distribution of the world's productive resources. 
Hence, as far as oil is concerned, it is the 
pricing structure rather than ownership, whether 
direct or surrogate, which is at issue. 
Footnote 
1. We took $20 billion, $15 billion, $15 billion 
for the US; $2.4 billion, $1.8 billion, $1.8 
billion for the UK; and $1.6 billion, $1.2 
billion, $1.2 billion for France. 
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Table 1:Long War, No Fiscal Contributions by Non-combatants or Gulf Countries 
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0.1 
1.0 
0.2 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 7 
0 .3 
0.2 
- 0 . 5 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 7 
0.6 
- 0 . 7 
0 .3 
- 0 . 6 
- 1 . 0 
0.0 
- 0 . 8 
1.0 
- 0 . 6 
0.2 
- 1 . 0 
- 0 . 9 
0.1 
- 0 . 7 
1.9 
2.3 
•0.1 
0.4 
•0.4 
1.3 
1.1 
- 0 .1 
- 0 . 9 
0.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.2 
- 0 . 1 
0.5 
- 0 . 8 
0 .3 
- 0 .1 
0.4 
0 .4 
- 0 . 4 
0.7 
- 0 . 6 
0.2 
- 0 . 3 
0.6 
0.4 
- 0 . 3 
0.5 
- 0 . 2 
0.1 
- 0 . 3 
0.4 
0.3 
- 0 . 2 
United States: 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
GNP 
Pri ces 
Investment 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Trade Balance 
Fiscal Def ic i t 
United Kingdom: 
GNP 
Prices 
Investment 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Trade Balance 
Fiscal Deficit 
France: 
GNP 
Prices 
Investment 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Trade Balance 
Fiscal Def ic i t 
Germany: 
GNP 
Prices 
Investment 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Trade Balance 
F i sca l D e f i c i t 
0.7 
0.7 
-0.2 
0.5 
•0.4 
•0.9 
1.0 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 . 2 
0.1 
0.3 
0.1 
- 0 .1 
- 0 . 1 
0.3 
0.4 
0 .3 
- 0 . 1 
0.3 
-0 .1 
- 0 . 3 
0.4 
0.5 
0 .2 
- 0 . 4 
0.4 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 3 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
- 0 . 4 
0.3 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 2 
1.0 
•0.6 
•0.2 
1.1 
0.0 
0.6 
0 .3 
0.1 
- 0 .9 
0.2 
0.4 
- 0 . 3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.7 
- 0 . 9 
0.3 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 1 
0.1 
- 0 . 3 
0.6 
- 0 . 5 
0.3 
- 0 . 5 
0.0 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 2 
0.2 
- 0 . 2 
0.1 
- 0 . 6 
0.2 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 .1 
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Table 1 (coot.) 
Japan: 
GNP 
Prices 
Investment 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Trade Balance 
Fiscal Deficit 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
0.4 
-0.5 
-0.1 
1.0 
0.0 
-0.6 
0.3 
0.2 
-0.8 
0.1 
0.4 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.5 
-0.8 
0.2 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.1 
-0.3 
0.6 
-0.6 
0.2 
-0.5 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.2 
0.3 
-0.3 
0.1 
-0.6 
0.2 
-0.3 
-0.1 
Gulf Countries: 
GNP 
LDCs 
-0.2 -2.7 -2.1 -1.8 -1.7 
GNP 
Debt Service 
-0.3 
0.6 
-0.6 
1.7 
-0.5 
1.0 
-0.4 
0.0 
-0.4 
-1.0 
Units: 
GNP, annual growth rate in percentage points 
Prices, annual growth rate in percentage points 
Investment as a percentage of GNP 
Short term interest rates in percent 
Nominal Effective Exchange Rates: the IMF's MERM index 
Current Account (Trade Balance) as a percentage of GNP 
Central Government Fiscal Deficit as a percentage of GNP 
Debt service as a percentage of exports 
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Table 2: Fiscal Deficits and Interest Rates with Fiscal Contributions from Germany, Japan, and the Gulf 
Co-operation Council in a Long War 
United States: 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Fiscal Deficit 
Short Interest Rates 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
United Kingdom: 
Fiscal Deficit 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
France: 
Fiscal Deficit 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Germany: 
Fiscal Deficit 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Japan: 
Fiscal Deficit 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
2.8 
1.5 
0.9 
- 0 . 1 
1.0 
0.2 
- 0 . 6 
0.2 
- 0 . 4 
- 0 . 7 
- 0 . 5 
- 0 . 9 
- 0 . 6 
- 1 . 0 
- 0 . 9 
0.7 
0.4 
•0.4 
- 0 . 1 
0.3 
0.1 
- 0 . 3 
-0 .1 
0.4 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 . 3 
0.5 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 3 
0.4 
0 .8 
0.5 
•0.4 
- 0 . 1 
0.3 
0.0 
- 0 . 3 
-0 .1 
0.3 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 . 3 
0.4 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 3 
0.3 
0 .8 
1.1 
0.0 
-0 .1 
0.4 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 . 3 
-0 .1 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 3 
- 0 . 5 
0.0 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 5 
0.2 
0.7 
1.0 
•0.6 
-0 .1 
0.4 
- 0 . 4 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 1 
0.0 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 5 
0.4 
- 0 . 1 
- 0 . 6 
0.6 
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Table 3: Fiscal deficits and interest Rates When There are No Fiscal Contributions, and No Tax Rises in US 
or UK in a Long War 
United States: 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Fiscal Deficit 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
United Kingdom: 
Fiscal Deficit 
Short Interest Rate 
Nominal Effective 
Exchange Rate 
3.5 
1.5 
1.0 
0.6 
1.1 
0.4 
0.4 
0.3 
- 0 . 2 
0.2 
- 0 . 4 
- 0 . 7 
0.0 
- 0 . 8 
- 0 .7 
1.1 
0.4 
•0.5 
0.0 
0.3 
0.0 
- 0 .1 
- 0 .1 
0.4 
- 0 . 2 
- 0 . 3 
0.5 
-0 .1 
- 0 . 3 
0.3 
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